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Abstract. This research inquires into how the public interest and private inter-
ests can be balanced by a new approach beyond the “Fair, Reasonable and Non 
Discriminatory” (FRAND) term and Royalty Free in the standardisation proc-
ess. Using the case of Audio Video coding Standard (AVS) in China, we ana-
lyse the mechanisms for treating the Intellectual Property Rights associated 
with technical contributions of stakeholders and establishing a patent pool with 
low royalty. The lesson from the AVS case is that, in the Public Dominated 
Model of standardisation (PDM), public units can successfully contribute intel-
lectual property but cannot easily match the role of private corporations in the 
standard’s implementation. The public-private dilemma in standards develop-
ment is more complex than that in terms of intellectual property rights. 
Keywords: Standardisation, Public Interest, Private Interest, Audio Video  
Coding Standard (AVS), Public Dominated Model of Standardisation (PDM). 
1   Introduction 
A standard is usually thought of as a consensus on optimal solution for a specific 
technical problem [1, 2]. The standardisation process, which involves evaluations of 
technical solutions and negotiations among stakeholders to achieve consensus on a 
technically optimal solution, is “by no means the execution of a linear techno-logic.” 
“It is, rather, contingent on institutional factors, actor constellations, actors’ interests 
and perceptions, technical knowledge, and what one might call the artifactual refer-
ence of specific coordination problem”[3]. There are bidirectional “translations” un-
derlying the “top-down” management and “bottom-up” coordination processes [4, 5]. 
On the one hand, the interests of stakeholders are “translated” into a technological 
contribution, which is expressed in technological language, then evaluated, negotiated 
and finally adopted into a technical solution. On the other hand, controversies and 
consensus on technical solutions are “translated” into interests (including the political 
and economic interests) of stakeholders [6, 7, 8]. At the end of this coordination proc-
ess, a set of technical rules and sub-rules emerge as an outcome of interest negotiation 
among relevant actors, and are formulated as a technical standard [3]. When a  
standard which is adopted for use by society at large, has intellectual property rights 
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associated with part of its technical specification, the complexity of the standardisa-
tion process acquires an additional dimension. Here, the status of the standard as a 
public good is juxtaposed by the temporary monopoly and associated monetary re-
wards on specific knowledge protected by intellectual property rights.  
How can public interest be served under the existing techno-regulatory framework, 
especially in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) area? Egyedi has 
argued that there is “a regulatory asymmetry existing between Intellectual Property 
Right (IPR) interests and compatibility interests” and that “the primacy of IPR owner-
ship and market competition” is anchored by current regulations while the societal 
significance of compatibility interests, that is public interest, is often neglected [9]. 
Such “asymmetry” of interests calls for novel theoretical and practical insights on 
whether the existing status quo can be redefined to better serve public interests. While 
“technical optimality” has traditionally been an expected prerequisite of standards, 
satisfying this condition in practice requires balanced representation of stakeholders’ 
interests in the process, which in turn requires support by a proper institutional setup 
[5, 10].  
This paper analyses the deficiency of the existing regulatory setup for handling the 
private and public interests in standardisation. Specifically, we show the limitations of 
the Fair, Reasonable and non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms for handling intellec-
tual property rights, and describe what may become a new approach to balance the 
private and public interests based on the case of the Chinese Audio Video coding 
Standard (AVS). Given the sheer volume and significance of ICT in today’s informa-
tion society, re-thinking the problem of better protecting public interest in ICT stan-
dardisation is timely and important. 
2   The Weak Position of Public Interest under the FRAND Terms 
Under the current institutional setup of the formal (committee-based) standardisation 
process, the holders of “essential” patents are expected to obey the FRAND licensing 
principle, while their actual interpretation of what FRAND means and how it can be 
implemented on a case-to-case basis is out of the control of a standard development 
organization (SDO). Such an organisational setup often contributes to a situation in 
which the patentee and the standard adopters would have different ideas on what 
FRAND means [11, 12]. 
The MPEG-family of standards presents an example, where the administration of 
the patent pool is carried out externally to the formal SDO body. MPEG LA is an 
agency which lies outside the formal SDOs, and is in charge of the MPEG-family 
standards and manages patent pools for patentees of MPEG2, H.264/AVC1, MPEG4 
Visual and MPEG4 System. It seems that, by reducing the cost for patentees to li-
cense their patents together, MPEG LA could facilitate a broader adoption of the 
standards under the FRAND framework. Ex post, MPEG LA largely succeeded in 
doing that in the case of MPEG2 standard, and met users’ reluctance to adopt MPEG4 
standards because the royalty burden was perceived to be excessive by some. For  
 
                                                          
1 H.264/AVC (Advanced Video Coding) is a CODEC standard developed by the ITU-T Video 
Coding Experts Group (VCEG) together with the ISO/IEC Moving Picture Experts 
Group (MPEG), which is technically identical to MPEG Part 10. 
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Fig. 1. Composition of Patent Pool of H.264/AVC2 
 
example, the European Broadcast Union (EBU) claimed that it was disappointed by 
the MPEG LA’s terms and conditions for the use of AVC [13]. The essential chal-
lenge underlying the MPEG LA case is that a “reasonable” requirement of FRAND is 
too vague and powerless to regulate the patent holders especially when patent licens-
ing is dealt with outside the SDOs after standard-setting. 
It is becoming more a rule than an exception that development of a public stan-
dard3 , such as H.264/AVC/MPEG4, is likely to involve contributions by private 
stakeholders which hold “essential” patents (as outlined in Fig.1). The patent pool of 
H.264/AVC/MPEG4 consists of 1135 patents, only 95 of which (less than 8.4%) 
come from non-profit institutes that include, for example, Columbia University, the 
 
                                                          
2  The data in Fig.1 is sourced from the MPEG LA website, http://www.mpegla.com/,  
retrieved on May 6, 2010. 
3 We use the term “public” to denote the global and cross-industry significance of an ICT stan-
dard, and the fact that it is developed and maintained by international formal standard setting 
organisations whose mission are to develop standards, which can “facilitate universal access 
so that people everywhere can participate in, and benefit from, the emerging information so-
ciety and global economy”. See e.g. http://www.itu.int/net/about/mission.aspx/ 
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Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, and the Fraunhofer Society 
for the advancement of applied research (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung 
der angewandten Forschung e.V.). The composition of H.264 /AVC patent pool indi-
cates that technical contributions from private corporations dominate the technical 
coordination process which we refer to as the Private (interest) Dominated Model of 
standardisation. When most of essential patents or most of patentees in a public stan-
dard come from commercial corporations and could be licensed outside SDO under 
the FRAND, the public interest is under risk of being “kidnapped” through high roy-
alty fees by the private interests of a few corporations. In the patent pool of 
H.264/AVC, 23 of all the 26 patentees are private corporations, by which AVC could 
be used as a tool either to pursue a monopoly high royalty fee or to limit the actions of 
possible new competitors.  
The ambiguity of the FRAND principles have come to be a serious problem in ICT 
standardisation, as exemplified by MPEG standard licensing case, when private inter-
ests have diminished its success to be established as a standard that serves public in-
terests. Especially when the standard is a multi-purpose and cross-industry “base” 
standard, such as MPEG standards, the obstacles caused by intellectual property right 
policies may have acted as true “reverse salients” that imposed a broad and deep re-
tarding effect on technological innovation [14]. However, without assurance for the 
protection of, and rewards for, their intellectual property, there may be a lack of posi-
tive incentives to motivate private stakeholders to contribute to standards develop-
ment. Such a juxtaposition of interests poses a question: how to deal with intellectual 
property rights more appropriately? How to protect the private interests of technical 
contributors while not sacrificing the public interests of users? 
3   Public Interest in AVS Standard Setting Process 
The Audio Video coding Standard (AVS) is an alternative standard set by the AVS 
Workgroup. It aims at solving the problem of an excessively high royalty fee caused 
by the domination of private interests in the H.264 or MPEG-family standards. To 
analyse the efforts of the AVS case is to shed light on a possible new approach to 
balancing public and private interests in ICT standardisation. 
3.1   The Mission of AVS 
The mission of AVS workgroup is to develop technical standards which serve public 
interests. Technically, the standard setting mechanisms of AVS (i.e., rules, proce-
dures, and organisation of the standard setting process) are essentially the same as that 
of the ISO/IEC and the ITU which jointly developed H.264/AVC/MPEG 4: there, 
top-down management structure is combined with bottom-up decision making and 
technical contribution processes. What is different is the policy on intellectual prop-
erty rights.  
To avoid the vagueness of FRAND principle, AVS adopted a different approach to 
the two commonly used FRAND and “Royalty Free” approaches. In the case of AVS, 
there is a so-called “public technical standard with pre-defined competitive- price 
licensing of patent pool” [15]. The committee’s decision on whether a stakeholder’s 
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technical contribution is acceptable is based on two factors. First, the technical contri-
bution should be technically advanced and available. Second, essential patents should 
be licensed free or licensed in an AVS patent pool, which is formulated under the 
management of AVS workgroup during the standardisation process. The innovation 
of this AVS standardisation process is that licensing of essential patents is regulated 
ex ante, and not ex post, as in the case of FRAND policy based standard setting.  
Another innovative aspect of AVS standard setting is that more than 20% of its 
members are public units which include universities and research institutes. These pub-
lic units contribute most of the essential patents to the AVS standard. For example, six 
of the nine contributors to the AVS video part are public units. They include the Insti-
tute of Computing Technology of the China Academy of Science (CAS), Zhejiang 
University, Tsinghua University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 
Beijing University of Technology, and the Sun Yat-sen University. Public units con-
tribute 37 of the total 42 technical contributions in AVS1-P2 and 35 of 52 contribu-
tions in AVS1-P7 (video for mobile application). The patent pool is managed by the 
AVS Patent Pool Administration Center which is a non-profit organisation [16]. 
3.2   Public Interest Dominates AVS Standard Setting Process 
Standardisation has received considerable attention since the 1980s, when Farrell  
and Saloner compared the market, committee, and hybrid standardisation mecha-
nisms. Formal negotiation through a committee can avoid some problems of market 
mechanism. Farrell and Saloner argued that a hybrid mechanism, and a market band-
wagon plus committee negotiation could be more effective in coordinating the social 
benefits [17]. 
Schmidt and Werle criticised the economic models for concentrating on choices of 
actors on the basis of a presumed “payoff matrix” while completely ignoring the tech-
nical content of standards [3]. They argued that, besides economic interests, political 
and professional interests play crucial roles in standardisation: they formulated an 
alternative set of three modes of standardisation, namely governments, markets and 
committees, which produce respectively three categories of standards: mandatory, de 
facto or industry standards, and voluntary consensus standards [18, 19]. Because of 
technical “infrastructural characteristics”, few standards are set by a pure market 
mechanism [20]. To balance the private interests and public interests, most standards 
are the outcomes of committee negotiation. But whether and how the committee 
mode differs within the different contexts is still unclear. How to set standards 
through a proper committee mode is an important problem to be solved. 
The techno-political context established by China’s National Plan - the Tenth Five-
Year Plan, and the development of the hi-tech industry in particular, enables a better 
understanding of China’s motivation to pledge to adopt 2,000 international standards 
a year for the first five years of the 21st Century so as to reach the target of 80 per 
cent of key industrial standards that conform to international standards [21]. While 
key industrial standards are important in the context of export strategies, the strong 
emphasis on the development of endogenous hi-tech industries also needs the devel-
opment of home-grown standards. The creation of a large number of endogenous 
standards requires a well-functioning standardisation infrastructure to support, main-
tain, and protect the intellectual property rights of the national standards, well-trained 
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staff to undertake the research and development, and the integration of the national 
and international operation of the standards development. 
With regard to standardisation infrastructure, the Standardization Administration of 
China (SAC) was set up at the top of the standards infrastructure hierarchy. The SAC 
has vice-ministerial status and is part of the Chinese General Administration of Qual-
ity Supervision Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ). The SAC was established to 
develop the Chinese standards agenda and to help bring domestic standards into align-
ment with international standards [22]. The AQSIQ emerged out of the reorganisation 
of China’s standards system in 2001 which followed accession to the World Trade 
Organisation. The SAC now serves as China’s “national body” to most international 
standards organisations including the International Standards Organization and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission which jointly develop MPEG-series stan-
dards. It oversees the administration of the national standards system [23]. 
With regard to handling intellectual property rights, the AVS Workgroup was es-
tablished to operate an open, international development process, with an independent 
intellectual property rights policy. The goal of reducing licensing costs involves the 
AVS in developing a patent pool that tries to balance Chinese law and cultural values 
with global practices. The goal of a 1RMB (a Chinese yuan) license fee per unit of 
consumer-level encoders/decoders in China may not have been achieved, but the exis-
tence of AVS as a competitor to the H.264/MPEG4 standard, with lower license fees, 
may have encouraged the MPEGLA to lower royalty fees for its controlled standards: 
in the end, this meets the initial goals of the AVS project to re-define the balance be-
tween public and private interests in the audio-video codec standards domain. 
Based on the case study of AVS standardisation, in our earlier work we formulated 
a model of committee standardisation, called the Public (interest) Dominated Model 
(PDM) [24]. The PDM has several distinctive characteristics as compared to the exist-
ing international regulatory standards development regime. 
First, public institutions play a more visible role in the PDM. To avoid the heavy 
burden caused by adoption of foreign standards bearing intellectual property right 
royalties, government agencies in developing countries will encourage public research 
institutes and universities to play a dominant role in setting endogenous standards, 
thus complementing the weaknesses of domestic firms at least in an initial stage. As 
representatives of public interests, the purpose of public research institutes and uni-
versities involved in standard-setting is to enhance research capability and to train 
talent, not to pursuit economic interests. Therefore, it becomes possible under the 
PDM to form a patent pool with a low-fee license. 
Second, under the PDM, intellectual property rights policies are made unambigu-
ous ex ante. In the case of the AVS, participants must follow a strict intellectual prop-
erty rights policy: according to it private patent holders could not claim patent royalty 
individually but have a binary choice of licensing it royalty-free or licensing it in the 
AVS patent pool. Standards set under the PDM are likely to have lower licensing 
costs, and thus contribute to wider adoption: the latter is especially important for in-
novation diffusion in developing countries. 
Third, implementations of standards set under the PDM are likely to require  
more support from industries in an early stage. Because of the weaknesses of firms’ 
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participation in PDM standard-setting, most of the firms may ride the fence and wait 
for a bandwagon effect to emerge. Even though the intellectual property rights poli-
cies under the PDM may be helpful for the implementation of standards, the licensing 
cost is not the only factor that determines the behaviour of a firm in making an adop-
tion decision. In the case of the AVS, there is an AVS Industry Alliance which is 
formed by 18 influential domestic firms to promote the application of AVS standards. 
The AVS Industry Alliance is expected to lead the creation of a bandwagon effect in 
the market. 
The PDM can motivate public non-profit bodies effectively to contribute technical 
efforts to standard-setting. This is extremely important when the incentives of other 
participants are insufficient, as is often the case with formal standard-setting [5]. The 
PDM can also moderate, or even minimise, the risk of public standards being manipu-
lated by private interests. By encouraging public bodies to play active roles in stan-
dardisation, the PDM can set up a patent pool which is timely and which protects both 
the public interests of a standard as a public good and the private interests of patent 
holders.  
4   Conclusion and Discussion 
Compared to developed countries, domestic firms and industries in countries that are 
catching-up possess less market and financial power and weaker research and devel-
opment capabilities. Hence, their technical capability and willingness to contribute to 
international standardisation is considerably lower. The case of AVS shows that gov-
ernment agencies in developing countries can encourage public research institutes and 
universities to play an active and a visible role in setting standards and in supplying 
public expertise where there is a lack of private expertise. Such an approach can ef-
fectively diminish intellectual property rights’ claims associated with the particular 
standard, as well as help to build the institutional and research and technical devel-
opment expertise necessary to leverage a standards development infrastructure. As the 
representatives of public interests, the purpose of the public research institutes and 
universities that are involved in standard-setting is to enhance research capability and 
to train talents, not to pursuit economic interests. 
The AVS case is far from being a success in terms of its implementation. While it 
is worthwhile to explore the Public Dominated Model of standardisation further, we 
learned from the AVS case that public units can successfully contribute intellectual 
property but they cannot easily match private corporations’ roles in the standard’s 
implementation. Usually, private corporations which could lead the standard’s adop-
tion would rather follow the bandwagon than actively lead it. On the other hand, pub-
lic units were charged with the creation and contribution of intellectual property to the 
standard, and yet thus have no actual duty to implement standards in the market.  
While a new patent pool approach proved a new promising solution to balancing 
public and private interest in standards, which carry the status of public good, it did 
not foster the implementation of AVS to the expected level. This makes us conclude 
that the public-private dilemma in standards development is more complex than that 
of intellectual property rights terms. Future research should take into account that a 
standard’s users, setters, and society at large all have a different understanding of 
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what represents an “optimal” balance of public and private interests in the standardi-
sation process. The May 2010 announcement of Google’s promoting of WebM4 – a 
royalty-free and open source based video/audio CODEC format [26] – presents a 
good example of such a complex set-up, where the balancing of public-private inter-
ests spans across corporate and open source technology development and across roy-
alty-free and intellectual property right-royalty based product offering. Thus, further 
research is needed to understand what the promising frameworks are for combining 
private and public interests in technology standards development to foster wider mar-
ket implementation of standard-based technologies, products and services. 
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